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Appropriating Imagination in Virtual Anthropology of Art 
 
Abstract 
This paper returns to the work of Alfred Gell and his ground-breaking essays on the anthropology of 
art, and vice versa, the “art of anthropology”, which came to challenge Hegel’s autonomy of art and 
its “spirit” (Geist), by creating an idiosyncratic art theory that focused on the inter-subjective play 
between intentions of social agents and indexes in terms of reciprocity and exchange (Gell 1998, 96-
153). It argues that the rapid evolution of virtual and interactive technologies taking place in the art 
world and the market transformed the process of distribution by indexing into formalized aesthetics 
(i.e. “style”). In other words, indexing has become a matter of aesthetics. In anthropological terms, 
these rapid developments raise a set of new technical and moral questions in appropriating 
imagination in the emerging staged plays between Host (i.e. “ethnographer”), User (i.e. “informant”) 
and the ethnographic field as a privatized mise-en-scene. In investigating this triangle, this paper 
compares four different types of “interventions”, in which imagination has been appropriated in four 
collaborative interdisciplinary projects, in order to argue for a re-evaluation of Gell’s theory within 
the context of the rapid developments of virtual technology. In discussing the intentions and 
nexuses of the four collaborative plays, the paper shows how the technological virtual revolution 
radically affected collaborative interventions, carrying radical implications for anthropology of art. 
 
The Problem: The Autonomy of Imagination in Anthropology of Art 
In Oscar Wilde’s essays on the art of art criticism, imagination plays a vital part in separating artists 
from art critics. For Wilde, art is all about form and style, not content: “To art’s subject-matter we 
should be more or less indifferent” (Wilde 1997, 927, my emphasis).  In this sense, art does not have 
a moral or educative character (as in Kant), or a transcendental sacred feeling that goes beyond the 
appearances of everyday morality and the material conditions of life and history. Rather, through 
the limitless freedom of personal imagination the artist escapes from the burden of material history 
and triviality of everyday life into the future. Wilde separates the artist from the art critic who gives 
content (a “message”) through interpretation. But art is empty without a message. This is the 
essence of The Picture of Dorian Gray. Dorian enjoys watching the picture growing old, but it was he 
all along who had aged, not the portrait. It is not the self-portrait that changes and grows old, but 
the eyes that look at it. His moment of death seems to be a moment of this self-realization, 
confirmed by the eyes of the servants: 
When they entered, they found hanging upon the wall a splendid portrait of their master as 
they had last seen him, in the wonder of his exquisite youth and beauty. Lying on the floor 
was a dead man, in evening dress, with a knife in his heart. He was withered, wrinkled, and 
loathsome if visage. It was not till they had examined the rings that they recognized who it 
was. (Oscar Wilde ‘The Picture of Dorian Gray’ 1997, 154) 
Perception ages along with the man, but not his portrait. This is the ultimate illusion, the portrait’s 
ultimate deception: the aspiration to Eternity. The essence of art is in its power to create reality out 
of a lie. Wilde further argued that the more realistic a work of art claims to be, the more vulgar it is. 
“All bad art comes from returning to life and nature, and elevating them into ideals (Ibid. 942). In 




this sense, if, and this is a big if, we accept that ethnography is a form of art, then, it is a vulgar form 
of art (as in Bourdieu 1984, Wilde 1997, Gell 1998). For Wilde then, art is not a mirror of society, but 
rather, a veil to reality (“A mask tells more than a face”, 1997, 949): “Art finds her own perfection 
within, and not outside of, herself. She is not to be judged by any external standard or resemblance. 
She is a veil, rather than a mirror” (Wilde “The Decay of Lying” 1997, 927, 933). The deceiving quality 
in the dialectics between art making and art criticism is essential in defending its autonomy from the 
trivialities of everyday life. Artistic deception (style) invites the receiver, or art critic, to make up 
these associations, because the artist is not interested in art’s given content. 
For in art there is no such thing as a universal truth. A truth in art is that whose contradictory 
is also true. And just as it is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can apprehend the 
Platonic theory of ideas, so it is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can realise 
Hegel’s system of contraries. The truths of metaphysics are the truths of masks  
(Oscar Wilde “The Truth of Masks”, 1997, 1037) 
 
In his “Discourse on the Science and Arts” [1750], Jean-Jacques Rousseau brutally attacked the 
hypocrisy underlying the bourgeois establishment of arts and sciences, which in his view reduced 
them to pleasing “established rules, a vile and deceitful uniformity […] Without ceasing, politeness 
makes demands, propriety gives orders; without ceasing, common customs are followed, never 
one’s own lights. One no longer dares to seem what one really is” (Rousseau 1987, 4). A number of 
left wing scholars, from Walter Benjamin to Pierre Bourdieu, Joanna Overing and Peter Gow, among 
others, politically developed the association of autonomous aesthetics with a critique of the 
bourgeois class. For them, art criticism’s artistic autonomy was a “bourgeois and elitist concept in 
the most literal historical sense, hatched and nurtured in the rationalist Enlightenment” (Overing 
cited in Sansi 2015, 67). In the beginning of the 20th century, both early anthropologists and 
modernist artists directly challenged the eclectic and elitist claims of artistic autonomy, as they both 
shared an obsession with “Primitive Art” (Fraser 1962). Painters of different epochs and styles (such 
as impressionism with Gaugin, Vlaminck, Matisse, cubism with Picasso and Brücke, and 
expressionism with Noble, Kokoschka, Marc, and the live art of Jackson Pollock) were all commonly 
labelled under Primitivism1. Picasso famously claimed that the Parthenon was nothing but a 
farmyard. Accordingly, the building’s meaning and historical importance was constructed through 
art criticism and the bourgeois appreciation of Classic Beauty in the 18th century on an imaginary 
ancient world, i.e. the excellence of ancient antiquity. For radical Pablo:  
Academic training in beauty is a sham. We have been deceived, but so well deceived that we 
can scarcely get back even a shadow of the truth. The beauties of the Parthenon, Venuses, 
Nymphs, Narcisusses, are so may lies. Art is not the application of a canon of beauty but 
what the instinct and the brain can conceive beyond any canon. […] The Parthenon is really 
only a farmyard over which someone put a roof; colonnades and sculptures were added 
because there were people in Athens who happened to be working, and wanted to express 
themselves. (Picasso cited in Chipp 1968, 271, 272) 
                                                          
1 Primitivism referred to the movement of appropriation of non-European art in modernist painting and the avant-garde 
movements of the 20th century. “The term Primitivism is used to describe the fascination of early modern European artists 
with what was then called primitive art – including tribal art from Africa, the South Pacific and Indonesia, as well as 
prehistoric and very early European art, and European folk art” Definition of Primitivism in TATE Gallery’s website [ 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/p/primitivism]. See also William Rubin “Modernist Primitivism: An Introduction”, 
and Arthur C. Danto “Defective Affinities ‘Primitivism’ in 20th Century Art” (The Anthropology of Art: A Reader, edited by 




For the bourgeois society the Parthenon is Beautiful, because it is seen as the “perfect” and timeless 
construction beyond history and the decay of time, by the bourgeois establishment (schools, 
universities, cathedrals, museums, literature, art criticism, art movements, public events, and so on). 
However, art critics and anthropologists failed to realize that they were unwillingly contributing to 
the same institutions they were meant to criticise in the first place, i.e. Oxbridge, Louvre, et al. From 
the artist’s perspective, the cross cultural association of art and anthropology raised a number of 
issues, regarding the quality (i.e. aesthetics) of the works produced and their interpretation of 
“reality” in a power play between representation and perception, kitsch and bad taste. From the 
anthropological perspective, “primitive art” referred to collective and anonymous artefacts of artists 




Since the 1960s, there have been a number of collective attempts through which anthropologists 
and artists joined forces in cross-cultural projects, in order to intervene into social reality in a variety 
of ways (Bradley and Esche 2007). Accordingly, the “experience” or praxis of making art defined it as 
a social and politicized process2. On the one hand, artists wished to further exploit and contribute to 
anthropological and social procedures. On the other, anthropologists wished to understand the 
power of art in intervening and transforming sensual and social reality (as in Turner 1982, Foster 
1995 and 1996, Svašek 2007, Schneider and Wright 2006, 2010, and 2013, Grimshaw and Ravetz 
2005, 2010, and 2015, Helguera 2011, Canclini 2014, Bakke and Peterson 2016). In this spirit, 
Schneider and Wright compiled three collections of essays focusing on “art-ethnography”, by which 
they referred to the close relationship between performative art and ethnography (2006, 2010, and 
2013). These collaborative projects promoted a variety of ways of empowering social relationships 
through art as social agency. They aimed to intervene into social reality while offering an inside into 
how anthropology dynamically constructs its knowledge in a self-reflective and intervening manner. 
Accordingly, the essays and works of art cited in the three volumes highlighted the grey area 
between anthropology and art by arguing that “primary divisions between the fields, from either of 
the two disciplines, often mask an ensemble of heterogeneous discourses that is fact have much 
common ground” (2010, 1). For the two editors and the artists cited in the volumes, the field is a 
multi-site “radical experimentation”, in which a “play with distance and intimacy” takes place, 
highlighting the importance of dialogue between artists and ethnographers (Schneider and Wright 
2006, 16, 29-51, and 2010, 3, and 10-18, and in Sansi 2015, 141-144). The two editors made the 
metaphor of mixing two colours that result to creating a new colour by intermingling and 
interweaving them, but crucially, when the painter the two colours separately retain their unique 
chromatic essence. The anthropological interest focuses on the strategies adopted by both artists 
and ethnographers in the field, including appropriation, materiality and texture, aiming “to ‘emerge’ 
knowledge, rather to simply find it, or it being embodied in a ‘final product’” (2010, 11). 
These works raised the question over the practice and ethics of intervening into social reality, in 
other words, overstepping the distance of “scientific” observation and coming into actual contact 
with the social reality and the “informants” of a place, came with the incorporation of the camera 
                                                          
2 In his essay on “The Artist as an Ethnographer?”, Hal Foster pinpointed that the first radical call to artists “to intervene, 
like the revolutionary worker, in the means of artistic production” came from Walter Benjamin in 1934 at the Institute for 
the Study of Fascism in Paris (Foster 1995, 302).  
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from early photographic documentary and ethnographic filmmaking to visual and material studies in 
culture and society. Pink (2006 and 2007) offered a historical context in the general term of “applied 
visual anthropology” in reference to a variety of practices that incorporated images as points of 
reference. Pink highlighted the impact of the camera in the work of a number of filmmakers, from 
the early works of Margaret Mead, Richard Chalfen, and John Collier Jr., to the 1970s participatory 
“collaborative” projects (i.e. “shared anthropology”) of Jean Rouch, and the politically charged 
chunks of reality of the MacDougalls (“intertextual cinema”). From these visual experiments that 
aesthetically crossed the line between ethnography and avant-garde, the practice of filmmaking 
reinvented ethnography by recognizing the presence of the ethnographer / Camera in the field (as in 
Dziga Vertov’s “Cine Eye” montage method [1919] applied in his classic Man with a Movie Camera 
[1929]). In a Brechtian fashion, the recognition of the presence of the camera’s Eye and its 
participatory role, in other words its impact on the field, was based on the breaking of the illusion of 
reality. In this self-reflexive understanding of research as a constructed praxis gave birth to a number 
of new types in applied anthropology, including that of digital ethnography. New media and ways of 
engaging with the digital and virtual world, such as blogging, posting videos, or contributing in virtual 
events, revolutionized both ethnography and ethnographic filmmaking in an interdisciplinary 
manner. New collaborations between designers and artists, coming from a variety of disciplines 
including anthropology, engaged within “emerging” environments in interactive ways (Pink, Horst, 
Postill, Hjorth, Lewis, and Tacchi 2016, 3). In turn, such collective efforts encouraged teamwork, and 
simultaneously, promoted mediation as a means of intervention: 
As social intervention, applied visual anthropology usually takes the form of a problem-
solving practice that involves collaborating with research participants and aims to bring 
about some form of change. This characteristic sets it apart from academic visual 
anthropology, which is also usually collaborative, but is more often exploratory rather than 
problem-solving and does not seek to intervene in or change in any way the lives of the 
research participants […] Moreover applied visual anthropology usually involves a distinctive 
form of what we might tentatively refer to as “cultural brokerage” (Pink 2007, 12) 
In highlighting the gap between theory (academic) and practice (applied), Pink made the crucial 
point that the two contrasting fields of knowledge complement and contribute to each other’s 
respective methodologies, by “producing a range of new engagements at its boundaries” (Ibid. 13). 
The (r)evolution of new media and virtual technologies enhanced such new engagements with the 
world in a variety of creative and provocative ways. In recent decades, the practice of applied visual 
anthropology made gigantic leaps of progress towards using digital video (DV) and virtual reality (VR) 
sensory technologies. For instance, ethnographic filmmakers do not simply reflect upon a certain 
framed chunk of “reality” (i.e. a “mirror” of society), but politically interfere and intervene in the 
field by aiming to change the sensuous and/or social reality, and its everyday norms for the better. 
Accordingly, the camera becomes an extended tool of the ethnographic Eye that does not simply 
observe, but interferes with a situation enacted in front of, and upon it. The tendency to disrupt 
everyday continuity by visual means was the first interactive intention (in Alfred Gell’s terms). 
Since the 1990s, the ongoing rapid evolution of digital technologies in human interaction with 
computers radically opened up the anthropologically “field” and its scope, through collaborative and 
intervening projects that did not simply aimed to observe the human environment and human 
interaction in the traditional sense of fieldwork, but also, to change it. By doing so, the new 
generation of ethnographers evolved through an interdisciplinary set of skills and education, 
changing our understanding about the human habitat (i.e. “Anthropocene”) in direct relation to the 
ongoing evolution and intervention of technology in our daily lives (Pink 2006 and 2007, Horst and 
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Miller 2012, Wasson and Metcalfe 2013, Aiken, Schlieder, and Wasson 2014, Pink, Ardevol, and 
Lanzeni 2016). The collaborative intervention in people’s everyday lives through digital art and 
functionality raised moral and ethical issues in respect to its use and authenticity. In his TED 2017 
public address, the “guru” of virtual reality, Jaron Lanier, called social network giants “behaviour-
modification empires” (Lanier 2017)3. The idea is that personalized advertisement and other traits of 
surveillance in the Internet promote moralized “suggestions” as normalities, which directly target 
the user by stylistically intervening in their personal ways of living, in a way that modifies the user’s 
behaviour, conduct, and habitus. An example of so-called “ethnographically” work for private 
companies is the collaboration between Motorola’s Mobility Applied Research Centre and the 
Department of Business Anthropology of University of North Texas, which focused on everyday 
applications of media and digital technologies in kitchens (Wasson and Metcalfe 2013, and in Pink, 
Ardevol, and Lanzeni 2016, 5). However, elsewhere, researchers highlighted “ethical grey areas” in 
this kind of consumer-oriented research (Aiken, Schlieder, and Wasson 2014, 38-61). In an extreme 
context, social and personal interventions become a means of social control with marketing 
interests, while ethnographic research becomes the emerging tool, but a tool nevertheless, to 
private companies. It is the liberal belief in a neoliberal world that if design and anthropology are still 
forms of artistic expression, then they both need to stay amoral and free of private interests. Below, 
I will be discussing the intentions and nexuses of four projects, in order to show how technological 
evolution radically affected collaborative interventions. 
 
PROJECTS 
1. Our Sacred Seed (Qa Loq Laj Iyaaj), and Beneath the Cross (Rub’el Kurus) 
For example, the filmmaker-anthropologist Carlos Y. Flores (2007, 209-224) collaborated with Mayan 
Q’eqchi’ communities in post-war Alta Verapaz in Guatemala, for the production of Our Sacred Seed 
(Qa Loq Laj Iyaaj), and with the Catholic missionaries for the production of Beneath the Cross (Rub’el 
Kurus). In the spirit of Clifford and Marcus (1986), Flores identified a self-reflective process as a 
means of discovering his “own identity” in relation to the “indigenous” collaborators. In comparing 
the two projects, he highlighted a number of issues in the practice of “shared anthropology” (a term 
deriving from Jean Rouch’s method of visual anthropology) including the impact of both his presence 
among the local filmmakers and the impact of external institutions, such as the Church, on a deeply 
traumatized and politically sensitive post-war area of the world. In this context, he distinguished the 
“therapeutic” nature of the first film, from the cathartic character of the second film as a collective 
reflection of the past. Accordingly, the cathartic character of the second film came under the 
sponsorship of the Catholic Church, which aimed to deal with the traumatic and unsaid memories of 
the past. In a confessional manner, the film promoted forgiveness through suffering and unity for 
the “community”. The film’s dominant image, a shot of a mourner carrying a fifteen-metre cross 
with the names of the 91 people lost in the violence in the 1980s, ultimately symbolizes this 
collective catharsis. 
Here, by intervention, Flores referred to the process of producing and editing the two films, as well 
as, projecting them back to the nameless and anonymous members of the “community”. The 
                                                          
3 “The Future of Our Digital Lives” (November 13 2017, London, Emmanuel Centre. Watch the entire TED Talk at 





ideological appropriation of the past by Catholic missionaries exposes certain aspects of the turn to 
subjectivity (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Self-reflection becomes the means of confession, the 
“community” is elevated to a Durkheimian sacred ideal that overruns the rights and choices of 
individuals, and the process of fieldwork-ing becomes the means of both personal and communal 
catharsis in the archetype of Christ. The anthropologist’s analysis of his experience exposed a 
number of ideological characteristics of Catholicism and re-contextualized the process of self-
reflection as a kind of confession for the sins of anthropology. He even seems to be apologetic about 
the way the anthropological practice objectifies subjects and subjectivities into objects (2007, 221). 
The hidden guilt of his self-awareness, maybe for being a latino and not “indigenous” in his words, 
along with his moralized call for “collective action”, makes the reader wonder if Marx was indeed a 
Christian. The cathartic value he gives to the two films epitomize this approach, as the true 
intervention he really reflects upon is that of the Catholic Church. The latter, seized the opportunity 
to propagate its ideology and moral values, and even, to aesthetically impose the Cross as a 
“symbol” on and of the “community”. In Flores’s words, following the arrival of the Catholic 
missionary “people became more able to talk of and rationalize disturbing past events and integrate 
them in a more organized fashion into their cultural practices and beliefs” (Ibid. 219). 
Finally, it is key that the interpretation of this “process” is left wide open by the ethnographer. This is 
a kind of neutralizing defence mechanism against political critiques or variety of interpretations of 
the fragmented traumatic past, which the Catholic Church aimed to take on under its missionary 
wing for the future common good, i.e. the “community”. Social intervention here is the ideological 
intervention of the Catholic Church who seized the opportunity to expand in the war-torn areas of 
Guatemala. The kind of contemplating self-reflection and peace the Church preaches is in the name 
of Jesus and the “common good”. After all, for many believers both Marx and Jesus fought for the 
common good. However, as Hamelink noted the concept of common good “suggests a societal 
consensus” open to different interpretations. “Actually, its meaning is often defined by the most 
powerful groups in society and rarely coincides with the needs of the less powerful” (Hamelink 
2000,4). The claim to common good is a claim to power, presuming there is a majority of agreeable 
consensus behind what is thought to be “good” (and for whom) in the first place. Therefore, “shared 
collaboration” is open to a variety of meanings, depending on a variety of interpretations, personal 
and political circumstances, within specifically contesting interests.  
In this context, George Marcus argued that the turn to self-reflexivity in anthropology, or “critical 
reflexivity” as he called it, “failed to generate new strategies, forms and norms of practice to 
encounter the more complex, parallel and fragmented worlds that many fieldwork projects must 
now negotiate”. In other words, it failed to fulfil its promise, i.e. “to unmask and transgress a 
hegemonic regime of naturalistic modes of narration and representation” (Marcus 2010, 84). In 
making his point, Marcus cited Raymond Williams’s defence of Realism as a bourgeois form as being 
critical for the sake of criticism without offering any alternative modus operandi for anthropologists 
and artists to work on (ibid, 85). In doing so, Marcus returned to the praxis of fieldwork in the long 
term a site that stretches far beyond the first contact of the fieldworker with the “field”. Marcus 
aesthetically highlighted the vivid “theatrical or filmic” character of contemporary anthropology 
“with a distinctive visual style”. In doing so, he highlighted the problems in pedagogy, i.e. teaching 
about fieldwork in anthropology, “in elaborately visualized tableaus, scenarios, and stories. Such a 
dramaturgical regime of method is at its most effective when the experience of fieldwork actually 
corresponds, roughly at least, to the imaginary anthropologists deploy to frame what they report to 
each other from their own experiences” (2010, 88). Hence, Marcus promoted collaborative projects, 
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including pedagogical ones, which are cross-cultural and theatrical processes (i.e. the “field” as a 
stage, “mise en scene”). In an idealist manner, he insisted: 
This is distinctly not about an ethnography of elite cultures but rather access to a 
construction of an imaginary for fieldwork that can only be shaped by complicitous alliance 
with makers of visionary or anticipatory knowledge who are already in the scene or within 
the bounds of the field. The imaginaries of knowledge makers who have preceded the 
ethnographer are what the dreams of contemporary fieldwork are made of (Marcus 2010, 
91)    
In this context, Marcus critically re-evaluated Foster’s critique of the adaptation of ethnographic 
methods in art, by reversing the argument (i.e. discussing adaptations of art in ethnography). Marcus 
indirectly referred to the avant-garde obsession with the Primitive as evoked by the “Malinowskian 
mise-en-scene”4, and Malinowski’s “confinement” in the words of Raymond Firth (Firth 1967, 17, 
Marcus 2010, 86-90, and Paganopoulos 2018, 2). Marcus dismissed such isolation within the 
contemporary globalized setting, by criticizing ontological notions of alterity between the “self” and 
the “world” as “philosophical narcissism”. Above all, he warned about the institutionalization of such 
“cultural politics of marginality” and “ideological patronage of which Walter Benjamin had warned” 
by neoliberal multinational capitalism (Marcus 2010, 85). Instead, Marcus promoted collaboration 
between artists and ethnographers in projects that have sociological nature and direct impact on the 
social environment where they are staged as such, as in the setting of a theatre performance. 
Accordingly, Marcus identified “collaboration” as: 
Collaboration is a ‘grass roots’ imaginary’ that people of means and purpose can undertake 
to interrupt older practices and habits of relating to, and being effective in, the world at a 
level of personal relations that the idea of collaboration evokes. Its popularity, in a lower 
key, is undoubtedly associated with the much more hyped drive for ‘innovation’ (and 
improvement) in every sphere of contemporary human experience (Marcus 2018, xi) 
Marcus recognized the potentiality and impact of the contemporary emphasis on collaboration to 
re-evaluate and re-define fieldwork as an experiment. In this context, Estalella and Criado’s recent 
collection of essays (2018) returned to the ethnography as experimental practice, echoing in many 
respects the video experiments of the 1990s as ethnographic collage (Russell 1999 and Clanton 2018 
83-96), but opening it to an improvised open-ended play with method (as also in Holms and Marcus 
2005 and 2008, and Canclini 2014). In this context, Estalella and Criado encouraged the contributors 
to the volume to revisit sites and spaces in order “to look again” at previous projects, with 
“modesty” in Marcus’s opening advice to the editors (my emphasis). One of those features is the 
open dialogue between artists and the public, which ideally helps to understand how the artists 
make and reproduce their public, and vice versa, how the public’s understandings and reception of 
an artefact contributes to the evolving of anthropological ideas. This kind of “moral argumentation” 
(Hamelink 2000) refers to ethical dialogue and reflection as a process of identifying alternative 
solutions that can contain a number of different, if not opposite, point of views. Nevertheless, 
Estalella and Criado’s aim was to contribute to “the emergence of designed second-order 
observations and interventions within fieldwork devices of various kinds that have been a 
controversial, if not virtually forbidden, topic in the professional culture of anthropological method” 
(Ibid. xii-xiii). Here, I wish to highlight that social and material interventions return to Gell’s idea of 
                                                          
4 By “mise-en-scene” Marcus refers to “the imaginary that mediates and regulates the expression of method in 
anthropology” (2010, 88). 
8 
 
art as a technological device by looking at intervention as an experiment through the use of 
“fieldwork devices” (Estalella and Criado 2018, 2). These “experimental collaborations” ideally aim to 
change the epistemological understanding and approach of ethnographers to the field and to so-
called “informants”. Similar ideas are especially relevant to applications of design and anthropology 
in architecture and the home environment, which I will be discussing below in relation to aspects of 
the work of Sarah Pink. 
2. 3-D Printed Homes 
The rapid (r)evolution of digital and virtual technologies transformed visual and digital anthropology 
into an emergent “living process” by intervening into social reality in imaginative and disruptive ways 
(Pink 2007, 6-14, Miller and Horst 2012, 4-10, and Pink, Ardevol, and Lanzeni 2016, 1-26, among 
others). New digital-material settings became important in our understanding of how humans 
interact with machines and with each other “as a process, and as emergent, not as an end product 
or finished object” (Pink et al. 2016, 10). Here, visual anthropology moved away from simply 
recording chunks of reality, into experimental ways of imagining, and even, making reality happen. 
This freedom of expression from the material constrains of everyday life echoed the spirit of Picasso 
who claimed that “everything you can imagine is real” (The Arts “Picasso Speaks”, 1923). Its aim is 
not to aesthetically please, or to offer an intrinsic meaning to history. Rather, the collaboration 
between digital and visual anthropologists developed on the premise “to examine the complex 
interfaces at which we engage with technologies, architectures and narratives that constitute the 
materiality of the everyday and how futures are imagined, forged and made” (Pink et al. 2016, 11). A 
popular example of this development is designing digital-material and sensory environments that 
directly intervene in everyday living, such as offering affordable and ecological homes. Designers 
first conceptualize the structure and style of new homes on a screen, and then simply print them on 
the building site using ecological materials. Such work requires the collaboration of a number of 
experts, including architects, digital designers, the local council, ecologists, and anthropologists. 
From an anthropological perspective, the interdisciplinary approach to material life opens a dialogue 
between virtual design practitioners and anthropologists, in order to find practical solutions 
regarding current global issues, such as housing, sustainable ways of living, global warming, waste 
and pollution in overcrowded urban areas. Accordingly, “digital technologies increasingly expected 
to provide some, if not the, key solutions for transforming consumption” (Pink, Mackley, Mitchell, 
Wilson, and Bhamra, 2016, 80). On July 6 2018, BBC introduced us to “the World’s first family to live 
in a 3D-printed home” in France. We read in the report: 
 
The house was the brainchild of Benoit Furet, who heads up the project at University 
Nantes. He thinks that in five years they will reduce the cost of the construction of such 
houses to 25% while adhering to building regulations, and by 40% in 10 to 15 years. This is 
partly because of the technology becoming refined and cheaper to develop and partly 
because of economies of scale as more houses are built. Printing, he adds, allows architects 
to be far more creative with the shapes of the houses they are building […] it is also more 
environmentally friendly than traditional construction, as there is no waste. Mr Furet’s 
dream is now to create a suburban neighbourhood with the same building principles […] 
Social housing is something that touches me personally,” Mr Furet says. I was born in a 
working-class town. I lived in a little house. My parents –who are very old now- still live in 
the same house.” (BBC’s Victoria Derbyshire programme, aired on July 6 2018, and article by 
Michael Cowan, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44709534 [July 16 2018]). 
This brief BBC report reveals the personal (individual) and collective (social) motivation of the 
architect Benoit Furet in starting and engaging with the project. He makes it clear that the 
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underlying motif for him is his upbringing in social housing and his understanding of the everyday 
difficulties for a family without property. He refers to his parents who still live in the same house, 
implying that by printing new affordable houses he can help people like his parents to upgrade their 
living and safety standards. This personal motivation (subjective aim) takes him to the more practical 
issues of social housing (objective aim) including the need to create and use more space within a 
limited budget, to improve the living conditions in social housing areas, and to contribute in the 
current wave of ecological designed buildings set in cheap housing neighbourhoods. Here, the 
personal and the collective meet in common ground, or as Immanuel Kant had put it, in terms of 
“common sense”. The designer can both reflect on his personal past living in social housing, and 
imagine and contribute to a future where social housing is clean and cheap. 
Such collaborative projects were instigated by LEEDR (Low Effort Energy Demand Reduction 2010-
2014)5 that brought together social anthropologists, designers, computer scientists, and engineers.  
One of LEEDR’s aims was to explore “what people do with digital media in their everyday lives in 
their homes, how digital technologies already form part of everyday life, in both their tangible and 
intangible forms, and how people improvise with digital technologies in everyday life” (Pink, 
Mackley, Mitchell, Wilson, and Bhamra, 2016, 82). From the anthropological perspective, the 
ethnographic research incorporated in such projects, structurally echoed the video project of the 
Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities above, although obviously very different in scope, content, and aims. 
As in Flores’s video productions amongst the Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities, it consisted of three 
stages -in the ritualistic pattern of a rite of passage. The first stage consisted of making a video tour 
to give a sense of the “sensory aesthetic” of the home, in terms of how it was experienced and 
maintained over long periods. Following this reflective process, the ethnographer encouraged a 
pretend play of the “participants” who re-enacted their daily routines, in order to highlight any 
idiosyncratic and other differences in the way people consume energy. As in Flores’s project, the 
final stage of aggregation consisted of incorporating feedback by showing the results to participants 
and inviting their comments, opening a discussion regarding how they make themselves “feel right” 
at home. The collaborators put their emphasis on the process of feeling right at home, in terms of 
the environment’s “atmosphere”, as an “ongoing improvisation” of “people as directors of flows” 
(Pink et al. 2016, 83, 89-90). In observing human interaction with digital systems, they directly 
involved humans and machines alike into the “atmosphere” of home, thus, overcoming the 
separation between persons and material things. In this way, the hosts of the project studied the 
interrelationships emerging from their co-existence in such new virtual-material spaces. 
Their research draws from Hallam’s and Ingold’s (2007) emphasis on improvisation as an open-
ended performative engagement of human agency and intentionality –in the spirt of Alfred Gell, see 
below-. The idea is that by following so-called “directors of flow” the designer, with the help of the 
ethnographer, would be able to understand and imagine a better standard of living within an 
ecological setting. Ideally, this would accommodate both the idiosyncrasy of each individual, as well 
as, contain and set in order any improvisations and points of departure from the individual’s daily 
habitus, including hygiene routines, using electricity resources when not at home, and so on. In 
doing so, the collaborators incorporated two new apps. ANIMA “is a proxy for the heartbeat of the 
home [sic], a dynamic illustration of the home’s energy use and activity levels that adapts in relation 
to predefined targets [set by householders]” (Ibid. 92, my emphasis). The “heartbeat” of the home is 
a metaphor of the home as a living body, including its energy consumption. The home becomes the 
extension of the intentions of its users giving them personal responsibility in treating their new 
                                                          
5 Visit also project’s website Energy and Digital Living at www.energyanddigitalliving.com [July 17 2018]. 
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home as an equal family member and respect its needs. KAIROS, on the other hand, is a sensory 
“digital intervention concept” which personifies each participant’s energy consumption and 
appliances, by recording how people use their “energy flows” [sic] to make their home “feel right”. 
Both apps treat human and technological agency as one.    
In their article on energy demand reduction and digital-material housing, Pink et al. (2016, 79-97) 
contextualize such enterprises within the anthropological discourse in two ways: On the one hand, in 
ethical terms in respect to self-responsibility and urban sustainability; and on the other, in terms of 
intentions as a kind of magical technology (Alfred Gell). In this context, they use “ethnography” and 
imaginative design to disrupt the dichotomy between anthropology and design, the first referring to 
human activity and creativity, and the second to “affordances”6 and digital design, respectively. Here 
“intervention” is not limited to self-reflection and self-realization within a certain ideological or 
religious context (as in the example of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities above). Instead, it seeks “to 
change human behaviour” towards the material world (Pink, Mackley, Mitchell, Wilson, and Bhamra, 
2016, 80). This in turn responds to “the need to restitute the ‘user’ or the ‘consumer’ as a 
responsible citizen and craftsperson” (Pink, Ardevol, and Lanzeni 2016, 4).  The authors even 
politicize the effort to print affordable houses as a response to “the problems associated with the 
ways in which neo-liberal regimes place responsibility on individuals to change their (energy 
consumption) behaviour once sensitized to it through behaviour change campaigns” (Pink et al. 
2016, 80). 
The issue with intervention in this context is that it is moralized and almost elevated to a sacred 
quality (as in the Bloch’s interpretation of the child’s pretend play above). If the end of such 
enterprises is to alter human behaviour for the common “good”, then intentionality is morally 
oppressing and gradually surpassing creativity and individualism with a moralized system of control 
and modification of human behaviour within specifically designed spaces for living. Stripped away 
from their ecological context, however, digital-material designs are closer to Gell’s definition of “art” 
as a “technology”. This is not moral in any sense, but functional (echoing Picasso7). It is not beautiful 
in an aesthetic sense, but enchanting nevertheless. For it feeds on magical illusion and performative 
deception. It hides from the user the mechanisms of how it works, as if it works magically. In Alfred 
Gell’s study of animal traps (1996) the animal trap deceives the animal in order to trap it. The virtual 
homes deceive their inhabitants in order to accommodate them. Nevertheless, while technically and 
functionally both animal traps and virtual homes use the same emerging principles at work (namely 
illusion), there is a big ethical difference between them: Animal traps, like art works, are amoral 
                                                          
6 The term “affordances” derives from James J. Gibson and refers to the material the environment provides to animal 
(including human) life: “It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment” (Gibson 1979, 127). It is 
important to note that “affordances” exist independently in material nature. Nevertheless, when humans “discover” them, 
they tend to modify their environment to make it more suitable (i.e. affordable) to its occupants. 
See Gibson, James J. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. London: Allen and Unwin. 1966. 
Gibson, James J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 1979. 
7 Picasso famously claimed that the Parthenon was nothing but a farmyard. Accordingly, the building’s meaning and 
historical importance was constructed through art criticism and the bourgeois appreciation of Classic Beauty in the 18th 
century on an imaginary ancient world, i.e. the excellence of ancient antiquity. For radical Pablo: “Academic training in 
beauty is a sham. We have been deceived, but so well deceived that we can scarcely get back even a shadow of the truth. 
The beauties of the Parthenon, Venuses, Nymphs, Narcisusses, are so may lies. Art is not the application of a canon of 
beauty but what the instinct and the brain can conceive beyond any canon. […] The Parthenon is really only a farmyard 
over which someone put a roof; colonnades and sculptures were added because there were people in Athens who 




(Oscar Wilde)8. They are open canvases on which any individual can express whatever they wish to 
express, build, capture, or destroy for that matter. By contrast, digital homes are controlled 
environments, which record and influence interactive behaviour on a day-to-day basis, according to 
a certain consumer morality promoted by private companies through digital media and other 
channels of influence. Their personalized nature contributes to treating human beings as anonymous 
algorithms. 
Moreover, they are not in fact as personalized as they claim to be. As Jaron Lanier (2017) makes 
clear in his philosophical approach to virtual reality, advertisement and those who control the 
media, depersonalize the personality of a consumer by contextualizing it within certain modes of 
behaviour according to individual so-called “preferences”. The advertising agency then re-evaluates 
the targeted algorithm of the consumer, and re-categorizes the activity associated with this 
algorithm with a certain mode of behaviour that responds to certain “personalized” products. A 
number of companies now face a re-evaluation of their own policies towards their targeted 
audiences. Nevertheless, here we also see that, against Gell’s “anti-aesthetic” approach to art, it is 
equally important to discuss the formal and aesthetic qualities of a performance (artistic or not) in 
order to understand the material and ideological modus operandi at work -in a true Marxist fashion-. 
Nowadays, the experimental nature of ethnographic and collaborative practices has become the 
mainstream modus operandi of the new marketing elite. This is based on the old artistic deception of 
the advertisement industry: that Your - “self” is as important as the centre of (Y)our Universe. It 
enhances the Christianized illusion that the World cares about you. Well, in reality the World does 
not give a damn’ about you, because “it” does not exist in the first place. “It” is an illusion. The 
Company does. The Company is Real. The Company Is the World. 
3. Robot Factory 
‘No, I don’t want to play in this group, they don’t know how to play! They will do it like this 
little girl [pointing at a girl that was then sliding down]. They don’t think!’ A while later, he 
looked much happier. ‘How is it going?’ the ethnographer asked. ‘Much better now, good 
team!’ To the ethnographer’s eye, this and subsequent experiments, together with the 
analysis of his notes, interviews, recordings and graphics, point to the enormous importance 
of self-organization among the children during the game experience. This ‘social factor’ was 
something that was acting ineludibly as a disruptive force in every attempt by the designers 
to reconfigure the system to get the desired attitude of the user. Perhaps the results of 
Robot Factory were not those expected (especially in terms of promoting controlled healthy 
physical activity), but the Interactive Slide proved to be a good tool for socialization among 
children and for learning collective action coordination. While the designers were studying 
the data in order to correct system ‘errors’ to get the desired results, the ethnographer’s 
experience confirmed that the deeper he went into the analysis of the choreographic 
movements of the children playing with the evolving Interactive Slide, the more it appeared 
to him that he was trying to capture a fascinating elusive life form [Ingold 2011] (Ferrer, 
Ardevol, and Pares 2016, 130-131) 
Robot Factory was an experimental interactive game designed for children “to promote physical 
activity and face-to-face socialization […] as a way of compensating for the increasingly sedentary 
behaviours and isolated forms of sociality among young generations, usually associated with video 
                                                          
8 For Oscar Wilde: “Aesthetics are higher than ethics. They belong to a more spiritual sphere” (Wilde 1997, 1015). Art is 
amoral and indifferent, because artists are not concerned with interpretation, which is the job of the art critic, but “simply 
to create a mood” (“The Critic as Artist” 1997, 995, 999). 
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games and digital technologies […] fostering healthy physical activity in a controlled manner” (Ferrer 
et al. 2016, 116-117, my emphasis). In this context, the concept of Robot Factory was to promote the 
emergence of a team work ethic among individual children, in order “to force different users to act 
in parallel and they should all work together to, for example, construct something”, in this case a 
Robot (Ibid., 118, my emphasis). In theory, the idea of bringing together human-computer 
interaction (HCI) and ethnographic research was part of the ongoing dialogue between anthropology 
and design that took place in a mixed reality setting. Furthermore, it responded to “the need to 
resituate the ‘user’ or the ‘consumer’ as a responsible citizen and craftsperson” (Pink, Ardevol, 
Lanzeni, 2016, 4) in the Kantian moral spirit of world citizenship (Paganopoulos 2018, 20-21 and 32-
34). In this context, “the user is the ultimate consumer of a product or service, and, thus, the 
person’s experience is a key goal of the design” (Ferrer, et al. 2016, 119). The desired aim was to 
“force”, in the words of the authors, the children to interact with the Slide and with each other in a 
collective manner, according to the ethics of teamwork and as living parts of the system, with each 
of the actors having to play a specific role within the system. The term “host user” referred to those 
who designed the system, the “ethnographer” became the authority who supervised the system in 
action, while the “user” referred to the children participating in the system without having a full 
understanding of what they are participating in, or why. “In the context of the Lab […] the user was 
theorized, imagined and performed as a critical device together with the digital system, and as the 
‘other’ that the software of the interactive system had to confront.” (Ibid., 119). Accordingly, the 
designers of the project interpreted the desired interaction between children and the computer as a 
naturalized outcome –only when it worked “well”: “[…] the dialogue between actual living humans 
and the system was fluid and harmonious, like the symbiotic relationship of the flower and the bee” 
(Ibid., 125). 
However, in spite of the desired methods and targets, in practice the application of the Interactive 
Slide proved to be a much more complicated process. Significantly, it was the disruptive behaviour of 
children that tested the system to its limits, because the “‘incorrect’ way of playing interfered with 
the system’s ability to record and regulate the activity” (Ibid. 128). In other words, it was the 
imagination of the “users” (children) that undermined the designers (grown-ups) and challenged the 
program, developing into more successful interactive robots. The “anomalies” in the system, if I may 
call “anomaly” the unpredictability of a child’s imagination, made the role of the “ethnographer” 
integral to the project for qualitative analysis of the system in its entirety. This resulted to the re-
evaluation of the role of the “user”, in the same lines of anthropologists re-evaluated the agency of 
“informants” following the crisis of the intellectuals in the 1960s and onwards (Clifford and Marcus 
1986, 13-21, Paganopoulos 2018, 2-3 and 26, Calestani 2018, 136 and 141-142). Inevitably, following 
the experiment one of the questions raised was “Did they [children] play the same game as the host 
users?” (Ferrer et al., 2016, 128). From an anthropological perspective, as I will discuss below, this 
question has serious implications regarding the ethics of the experiment, especially concerning the 
Autonomy of Technology and Its appropriation of human imagination within the system. 
The project departed from the traditional ethnographic field in various ways. First, the 
“ethnographer” was actually a trained designer, not a trained anthropologist (Ferrer et al., 116). 
Second, the “field” was a highly controlled interactive environment. Third, the original purpose of 
the experiment was educational and ethical, as in the curriculum of a school or a church. Its aim was 
to observe without intervening, and yet, to encourage co-operation and the ethic of team work 
against so-called “anti-social” attitudes of teenage children in their relation to new technologies, 
which are largely presumed by grown up moralists in the media, the academia, the church, and 
other public forums. It is noteworthy that this is only a presumption, one that completely ignores the 
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fact that young people use the social media to socialize in alternative ways from face-to-face. In 
addition to this, a second behavioural aim of the experiment was to encourage children to engage 
with each other and he machine through physical activities, again presuming without any basis 
whatsoever but media reports for that matter, that children do not exercise in their everyday lives. It 
is fair to say that the aims of the experiment had a conservative background, presuming the worst-
case scenario in order to encounter it with a deeply moralized and highly controlled environment, 
which supposedly encourages the “users” (i.e. the children) to act in their own free will. As Ferrer et 
al. acknowledge in their chapter:  
Thus, the user is included not as equal, but as a source of information or, at best, as a guest 
co-worker who may be necessary, as he or she can provide useful information for optimizing 
the design or simply knowing what to design, but who is excluded from fundamental 
decisions in the design process. However, in the case of HCI design, the nub of the issue 
seems much more complicated; it is also a matter of how the ‘thing’ that is being created 
intervenes in their interlocution. (Ferrer, Ardevol, and Pares, 2016, 120) 
The exclusion of the “users”, and simultaneously, their inclusion as living components of the same 
system from which they are excluded in the first place, inevitably brings in mind the power relations 
between ethnographers and their informants in colonial times. Furthermore, the assumption that 
technology makes children anti-social and unhealthy, provides a pre-moralized template of collective 
and “healthy” work that forces the children to participate in the emergent team. This process 
includes the virtual environment in itself, thus, transforming the “users” into “consumers”. To put it 
differently, without the software this process cannot exist. The question, therefore, directly relates 
to the way “users”, “consumers”, or “informants”, are appropriated within an autonomous virtual 
system of which they are forced to become living parts. A second question rising from the first one 
relates to the ethnographic authority in itself, which is undermined in relation to the “ethnographer” 
being in fact a designer, and to “ethnography” being diminished to a toolkit for the experiment. In 
these circumstances, the “experiment” is not as experiment as it claims to be, as it completely fails 
to engage with the children in an appropriate truly ethical manner. The host users, hidden behind 
their computer screens, observe the children playing, while taking their notes as in a psychological 
evaluation. The hosts treat the children as if they are patients or of less intellectual capability, 
without telling them why and even where they are. This liminal picture of the “users” is deeply 
disturbing from an ethical perspective, but in many ways reflects upon the virtual industry in relation 
to how it appropriates imagination by filtering it through highly controlled virtual platforms. 
Nevertheless, this is the artistic deception of the market: the idea that the Idea of the latest gadget 
or product addresses You, and you only. No, the consumer does not have a name, even though their 
names are called and used in Hotmail or Facebook by other actors. They are still algorithms and a 
means to making nameless impact and profit. 
The emerging privatized markets are part of the wider economic process of moving “from a 
production orientation to a marketing orientation […] This marketing orientation has had an 
enormous influence on the world in which we live” (Kimbell 2015, 46). Stickdorn (2015) on the other 
hand, highlighted the five principles of service design thinking in the open market: It is user-centred, 
co-creative, sequencing, evidencing, and holistic (2015, 34-45). The user-centre orientation gives the 
impression that the impersonal market is interested in the consumer on a personal “humanist” level, 
when in fact this is an artistic deception adopted and adapted by the advertisement and media 
industries. The principle of co-creativity takes us back to the morality of the collective, as discussed 
above in relation to the three visual projects. Sequencing plays a game exactly on the power of 
illusion and deception in the art of advertisement, forcing itself as an intentional intervention in the 
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private lives of consumers. According to this principle “Just like any good stage play or movie, a 
superior service should keep a sense of expectation without exacting strain upon the consumer” 
(Stickdorn, 2015, 41). Evidencing the intangible nature of today’s market is crucial, as a way of 
calculating the impact, and therefore, success of an Idea. Evidencing combines the consumers’ 
emotional responses to tangible products along with statistics from bills, brochures, number of 
visits, emails, and so on, among a variety of signs that affirm the golden rule of “standard customer 
service”. Finally, the holistic nature of service design, as in art, takes in account the “atmosphere” of 
the environment in which a service takes place, including “employee satisfaction and integration of 
sophisticated technological processes in pursuing corporate objectives” (ibid. 45). The entire system 
is based on connectivity of the individual consumer with organizations, whose members act as if the 
organization they work for is a living person with legal, and even, human rights. Conversely, the 
“ethnographers” employed to conduct their research focus on “the processes through which 
individual customers interacted with firms”, in order to “lead to an understanding of creating value 
with customers” (Kimbell 2015, 49). 
Elsewhere, Bloch (2008 and 2016) made the link between children’s pretend play, “imagination”, by 
which he refers to “the ability to create images” (2016, 82) and the constitution of the social in the 
field. Bloch associated imagination with the ability to think beyond the limits of synchronic time in 
terms of kinship and other groups formations. In this context, the ability to imagine a past and a 
future, beyond the current state of affairs, is integral in maintaining and developing social relations, 
what Bloch calls “the imaginary social” (2016, 84). The imaginary social is a functional matter of 
social order, offering a re-assuring sense of community and continuity. In this play, Bloch highlighted 
two point of point of views and ways of acting: one from the inside (referring to local experiences 
and beliefs), and one from the outside (referring to scientific observation of local experiences and 
beliefs). For an external reader, the universal perspective is an imagined one, used to make sense of 
and familiarize the dream-like image of the strange, exotic, and horrific Other. Vice versa, the local 
perspective retains its unique qualities in a complementary relation to the “world” out there, 
something which demands the full acceptance of the idea “to act as if there is a world” (Bloch 2016, 
83, and in Gaston 2013, 16 and 24, and Paganopoulos 2018, 23, my emphasis). 
As an example, Bloch described pretend play as the cognitive way of learning how to socialize, and 
through it, to develop a personal engagement with society. However, Bloch limited his appropriation 
of imagination through pretend play within the sociological explanation of power and order. In this 
context, Bloch defines imagination as the “shared representations” forming “a type of social system 
that has the potential to be infinitely larger in actual size and phenomenological duration”. In a 
Durkheimian sense of the “sacred”, imagination becomes an “unchallenged true fact” because it is 
shared by others. In other words, because of its collective nature (2016, 84). In making his point, 
Bloch cites Ward (1995): “Not only is this idea of individual creativity dangerously closely linked to 
recent developments in Western individualist ideology but also much psychological work shows how 
what might, at first, appear as the product of individual creativity turns out to be much more 
conventional than we are tempted to imagine” (Bloch 2016, 83). The link between “individual 
ideology” and neoliberalism is a political, if not a religious one. Yet, art history shows that original 
imaginative thoughts are product of individual minds, often socially outcasts, not collectives. From 
the perspective of anthropology of art, the concept of a “Western individualistic ideology” itself only 
reaffirms the stereotype of non-European artworks as collective and anonymous, while refusing the 
agency of individual “indigenous” artists and charisma authorship, in the old colonialist manner. 
4. Indexing as Aesthetics 
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Below, I am visually referring to two examples in which abstract imagination is appropriated through 
indexing into a finished product. The first example is the logo of the ultra-popular hip-hop band 
Twenty / One / Pilots (Figures 1 and 2), and the second from ISADORA software used in live 
performances and installations as a means of controlled improvisation of the mise-en-scene of 
interactive performances used I theatre and live events (Figures 3 and 4). Both visual examples show 
the importance of indexing and intention in modern art, allowing the space for improvisation in 
controlled manner. The first is the creation of the public, i.e. consuming followers of the band, 
simply using their keyboards. The second offers the technical means to offer a different and unique 
setting every time a certain idea is performed –as they say in theatre that every performance is 
different-. Furthermore, in the spirit of art theory, these applications and appropriations remain 
amoral, functional, and essentially technical. Furthermore, they include the consumers, in the first 
case the fans of the band, and in the second case, the technicians who use ISADORA to construct live 
installations and performances. 
 
 
Figure 1. Music duo Twenty One Pilots Logo 
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Figure 3. Indexing (i.e. “inputting”) sensors to central processor using ISADORA  
 
 
Figure 4. ISADORA’s application in www.chromosphere.eu [co-funded by the Creative 
Europe Programme of the European Union [last visit 23/07/2018] 
These applications return us to Alfred Gell’s theory of indexing and nexus as amplified by current 
Interactive Technologies. The first example shows the importance of the targeted audience’s input in 
the emerging market environment. Human action becomes digitized and communicated as an Index. 
On the other hand, ISADORA (among an ongoing wave of new programs) is used for visual 
programming in live performances and installations –similar to the Robot Factory discussed above. 
ISADORA processes language C by connecting a variety of sensors (visual, sound, atmosphere, 
rhythm, etc.) to a central processor, such as ARDUNO. In this context, both set the mise-en-scene 
(Marcus) referring to the stage on which ongoing action and controlled improvisation take place, as 
in theatre or ritual, through interaction between humans and machines. In this setting, indexing 
becomes a matter of co-ordinating (connecting) the variety of sensors to the central processor. This 




A re-evaluation of Alfred Gell’s Anthropology of Art 
Alfred Gell famously made the point that anthropology of art is not interested in form and style as 
aesthetic properties. It is not interested in what Beautiful is in its ideal sense, nor interested in 
treating an object as a text as art critics do (Gell 1998, 6). Gell’s remark regarding the 
“methodological philistinism” of and belief in aesthetics, echoing the study of spirits in anthropology 
of religion, has been long cited as an example of the “anti-aesthetic” nature of anthropology (as in 
Pinney and Thomas 2001, Schneider and Wright 2010, and also Burt 2013, 148, and Sansi 2015, 67). 
As Morphy and Perkins highlighted, the anthropological interest in form and style “provides a means 
of understanding how the objects are made, how they work and how forms are passed on and 
transformed over time […] the technical processes by which objects are manufactured […] as a 
system of encoding meaning” (2006, 323-324, my emphasis). In a series of essays, he interpreted 
artefacts as index technology and art objects as devices "for securing the acquiescence of individuals 
in the network of intentionalities in which they are enmeshed" (Gell 1992, 43). This approach 
conformed to his idea of “distributed” persons and objects, who play a “practical mediatory role”, 
and whose intentions are denoted by indexes and art nexuses towards the “patient”, i.e. user (and in 
Chua and Elliott, 2013, 5, my emphasis). In this theory, the mediatory role of such agents actively 
instigates mimetic and other transformative strategies of productivity within specific processes of 
magical-technological growth. Here, Gell developed his argument following the Epicurean 
philosophy: "[…] as the body grows, it sheds its parts, and these become distributed around the 
ambience[...] Epicurean theory saw the generation of simulacra as a ‘growth’ process -the ‘shedding’ 
of ephemeral skins from all things induced by a kind of 'pushing' from within” (Gell 1998, 108). 
Furthermore, the notion of the “distributed” person arguably derived from Marilyn Strathern’s 
concept of “partible” person (1988.): “[…] in which it follows from this concept that actions and their 
effects are similarly not discrete expressions of individual will, but rather, the outcomes of mediated 
practices in which agents and patients are implicated in complex ways. On the one hand the agency 
of the artist is rarely self-sufficient; on the other the index is not simply a ‘product’ or endpoint of 
action, but rather a distributed extension of an agent” (Thomas 2001, 5). 
An example of Gell’s reproached hunting traps as artefacts, and vice versa, artworks as kind of traps 
(1996, 15-38). For Gell, animal traps are artefacts “because they tend to embody complex ideas and 
intentions to do with the relationship between men and animals and because they provide a model 
of the hunter himself and his idea of the world of the prey animal” (Gell 1996, 15). Furthermore, 
although not highlighted by Gell, we could add here that in his approach to animal traps there is an 
underlying idea that art is all about deception, just like the animal trap, echoing the view of artists 
such as Wilde, Picasso, et al. Nevertheless, Gell expanded his point by comparing fishing traps with 
Damien Hirst’s Turner Prize winning installations (famously the dissected shark and the rotting 
sheep’s head trapped in sterilized glass). His aim was to re-evaluate the old connection, as well as, 
tension, between modernist avant-garde and its appropriation of Primitivism in terms of the 
network of “intentionalities” embodied in both styles and institutions (Gell 1996, 34-37). However, 
Gell failed to develop an important aspect of such appropriation, that he essentially referred to 
anonymous “ethnic” artefacts, which the institutions of intentions and networks re-categorize as 
“art”. I wish to argue here that central in the relationship between non-European and European 
artists is the denial of authorship that is not only methodologically problematic, but also, ethically 
discriminatory, reinforcing the usual stereotypes about “collective” or “traditional communities”. 
Furthermore, Gell’s point about indexing of the trap-within-the-trap, is a valid point regarding 
external institutions (museums, galleries, universities), art networks (art movements, agencies), and 
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marketing policies (the “primitive”, the “ethnic”, and so on). It has nothing to do with “art” as a 
making-process, or as the product of the imagination of a single and eponymous auteur. This ellipsis 
echoes Oscar Wilde’s criticism of the failure of the anthropologists to pinpoint to the first “cultured 
and fascinating liar”, the first caveman Artist who was “the true founder of social intercourse”, and, 
whose aim was “simply to charm, to delight, to give pleasure […] the very basis of civilized society” 
(Wilde 1997, 932). Hence, Wilde highlighted anthropology’s failure to incorporate and appropriate 
authorship within its institutionalized network of intentions. Accordingly, the difference “between a 
real Brillo box and a mock Brillo box by Warhol” (Gell 1996, 19) is not simply a matter of intentions, 
or Geist, of modern art galleries, though networking is equally important. But also, the fact that the 
fake Brillo box is “Warhol”, it is not just any box. As Picasso put it in his famous quote about the 
Parthenon: “It’s not what the artist does that counts, but what he is […] that is, the actual drama of 
the man. The rest is a sham” (Picasso cited in Chipp 1968, 272). This is modern art from which artists 
who had the unfortunate luck to be identified as “non-Western” were excluded and discriminated by 
the same “liberating” network of intentionalities of modern art galleries, academia, and the 
bourgeois public.  
It is important to highlight that Gell wrote in the 1990s, before the rapid developments in interactive 
technologies paved the way for the emerging market of virtual reality that develops through the 
fusion of organic and non-organic matter though the interaction between “human” and the 
“computer” respectively. This revolution makes the “anti-aesthetic” reading out-of-date and 
detrimental. The new advantages in virtual ethnography and design oblige us to investigate how 
new virtual styles and ways of interaction between artists, the targeted audience, and the market 
industry, rise through virtual and other interactive technologies. Indeed, in the face of the latest 
artistic innovations taking place both in the market and in the universities, distribution by indexing is 
transformed into form and aesthetics (i.e. “style”). In other words, indexing has become aesthetics. 
Furthermore, the latest developments in virtual technology have democratized the ways in which we 
can materialize our imagination by giving agency to “users”. The ethical and moral dilemmas 
regarding the impact of privatized technologies in our personal lives remain -as part of the Marxist 
tradition and material history of modernity. But even so, new virtual evolving technologies 
overcome these dilemmas by increasingly breaking away from the material conditions of production 
and consumption. This does not mean that world issues, such as poverty, inequality, health, 
pollution, and global warming, will magically seize to exist. We are still entrapped within the trap of 
capitalist exploitation and indifference. Yet, as ethical issues are rising above previous ideologies and 
moralized religions, virtual technologies that are incorporated in our daily lives as installations made 
by young artists and designers, anthropologists and architects alike, offer a new hope for the future. 
 I wish to argue here that in many ways these developments oblige us to return and re-evaluate 
Gell’s anthropology of art, emancipating it from the burden of modernism and post-modernism and 
its alleged rejection of aesthetics, towards new openings artists make in popular culture and 
everyday life regarding “our post-human” future and symbiosis with machines (Fukuyama 2002). 
Virtual anthropology offers a new way to engage with the world by disengaging from it. “The 
simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth – it is the truth which conceals that there is none. 
The simulacrum is true” (from the Greek tragedy, Ecclesiastes cited by Baudrillard 1988, 166). The 
virtual revolution offers a new role for anthropology that does not simply focus on morality and 
functionality, but rather, our eventual detachment from the natural world as the means of becoming 
living parts of it, rather than trying to control or integrate it into our old self-deluded moralized 
illusions of “progress” and “civilization”. In the spirit of Franz Boas, this denial carries the true 
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intention of anthropology of art, that is, to break away from classical antiquity towards the 
interaction between material and organic life. 
The great shift from material production to immaterial consumption has radically changed the way 
Imagination is appropriated in the market of Ideas. This is not Marx’s and Benjamin’s time of 
material production and reproduction that resulted to the loss of the artistic aura on a mass scale, 
but the time of consuming Ideas with virtually reproducing manufactured auras in advertisements. 
These strategies target You, the Consumer, Your name and family, on a superficial, and yet, socially 
effective personalized level. It is the time of marketing of Ideas, not Products. For Marx, it was the 
material conditions that predetermined and conditioned ideas and the ideology of an era. But that 
was back in modern times, when All-that-is-Solid-melted-into-Air. Nowadays, this entropy 
movement is set in reverse. In the virtual world, it is the ideas that condition material history, not 
the other way around. Today’s “creative economies” and personalized markets buy and sell 
individualities. The great deception is that the virtual world makes us feel special and unique, when 
we are still anonymous parts of the mass in a system co-ordinated by Silicon Valley and other 
centres of economic control (Jaron Lanier). 
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